The American environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott argues that we human beings are ethically obliged to promote and protect the environment as an intrinsic value. To do so, we should adopt a scientifically and philosophically informed postmodern land ethic which protects and nurtures the great chain of being (pyramids of energy) from soil to civilization. The practice of this Leopoldian land ethic requires that we transform our modernist utilitarian and Cartesian ethics which instrumentalize and alienate nature. Two key (...) works by Callicott outline his position as a mainstream academic deep ecologist: Earth’s Insights (1994) and Beyond the Land Ethic (1999). The French cultural and political philosopher, Luc Ferry, argues that deep ecological ideologies, such as Callicott’s, threatenthe historical enterprise of modernist humanism. The appeal of deep ecologists lies in their romantic and anti-Cartesian ideologies. In his book, The New Ecological Order (1995; Le nouvel ordre écologique, 1992), Ferry criticizes the deep ecologists (and he includes Callicott in this group) for their unjustified attacks on the traditions of humanism. In the conclusion to his book, deep ecological radicalism is equated with an anti-cosmopolitan “barbarism”. Ferry feels that the ideals of the European enlightenment and its modernist anthropocentrism which privileges human autonomy, freedom, and democratic ideals, have been undermined by the forces of the political left. (shrink)

In Part 9 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a series of five criticisms is presented against the Cosmological-Ontological Proof of God’s necessary existence. In essence, the Cosmological-Ontological Proof seeks to establish that that the chain of causes and effects that constitutes the world, despite being eternal, requires a cause, in virtue of the contingency of the chain and its members. The argument attempts to defend the position that, of the four possible causal explanations for the (...) chain of causes and effects -a contingent being that exists outside the chain; chance; nothing (in the Aristotelian sense of thisterm); or a necessarily existent being-only the latter can be successfully defended, leading to the conclusion that the cause of the world is a necessarily existent being. Of the five criticisms directed against this argument in Part 9 of the Dialogues, the fourth of these is the one that is most neglected in the literature: it is this criticism that I have selected for discussion in my paper. This criticism holds that since the causal chain is held to be eternal, it cannot have a cause, given that causal relations require temporal priority in the cause in relation to the effect, and that the effect be a new existent. However, since the Cosmological-OntologicalProof insists on the contingency of the causal chain as a whole and of each of its members, the fourth criticism is not regarded as a relevant criticism, inasmuch as all contingent beings require a cause in order for them to exist, and this includes the eternal causal chain that constitutes the world. In my paper, I attempt to support the fourth criticism of the Cosmological-Ontological Proof, by establishing that, in the context of this argument, the contingency of the causal chain and its members is not sufficient to establish that the chain must have a cause. (shrink)

Hume's analyses of human apprehension and of causality were the most penetrating up to his time and continue to have great influence. Contemporary Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri has examined both and identified three underlying errors: the failure to recognize that there are three stages of human intellection, and especially that the first, primordial apprehension, has quite unique characteristics; the attempt to place an excessive burden on the content of impressions while ignoring what Zubiri terms their 'formality of reality'; and the (...) failure to recognize that functionality, not causality, is the basis for most of our knowledge. Causal chains in general cannot be adequately known, and therefore are not and cannot be the basis of our knowledge of the external world. Only in the area of persons and morality does causality play a critical role. (shrink)

The article is based upon the following starting position. In this post-modern time, it seems that no scholar in Europe supports what is called “Enlightenment Project” with its naïve objectivism and Correspondence Theory of Truth1, - though not being really hostile, just strongly skeptical about it. No old-fasioned “classical” academical texts; only His Majesty Discourse as chain of interpretations and reinterpretations. What was called objectivity “proved to be” intersubjectivity; what was called Object (in Latin and German and Russian (...) tradition) now is related to as a phenomenon; what was called Subject either is looked upon as Cartesian “cogito” or disappeares at all; what was called Truth turned to be either method of demonstration (by positivists) or the author’s sincerity (by existentialists); what was called Essence is now merely a joke. Alternatively, we speak about Sense, Meaning, and Value. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The (...) proposal recommends itself as being capable of solving the problem of wayward causal chains and is promising as a way of avoiding epiphenomenalism of mental properties. (shrink)