This article contributes to a recent debate between Barnett and Block : 711–716, 2009), Bagus and Howden : 399–406, 2009), Barnett and Block, Cachanosky and Bagus and Howden regarding the conceptual distinction between demand deposits and time deposits. It is argued that from an economic perspective there is nothing inherently fraudulent or illegitimate about deposit accounts that are available ‘on demand’, but that this relies on certain contractual provisions. Particular attention is drawn to option clauses and withdrawal clauses, which “solve” (...) the problems raised by Barnett and Block, and Bagus and Howden. Previous authors have also neglected the asset side of banks balance sheets, and this is shown to further justify the legitimacy of fractional reserve banking. (shrink)

Economists tend to view ignorance as ?rational,? neglecting the possibility that ignorance is unintentional. This oversight is reflected in economists? model of ?information search,? which can be fruitfully contrasted with ?information browsing.? Information searches are designed to discover unknown knowns, whose value is calculable ex ante, such that this value justifies the cost of the search. In this model of human information acquisition, there is no primal or ?radical? ignorance that might prevent people from knowing which information to look for, (...) lacking omniscience. Unlike ignorance that is rationally chosen on the basis of an accurate cost/benefit calculation, radical ignorance can explain human error. An account of error as grounded in radical ignorance bypasses the need to appeal to irrationality in order to explain economic (and other) mistakes. (shrink)

Economists tend to view ignorance as “rational,” neglecting the possibility that ignorance is unintentional. This oversight is reflected in economists’ model of “information search,” which can be fruitfully contrasted with “information browsing.” Information searches are designed to discover unknown knowns, whose value is calculable ex ante, such that this value justifies the cost of the search. In this model of human information acquisition, there is no primal or “radical” ignorance that might prevent people from knowing which information to look for, (...) lacking omniscience. Unlike ignorance that is rationally chosen on the basis of an accurate cost/benefit calculation, radical ignorance can explain human error. An account of error as grounded in radical ignorance bypasses the need to appeal to irrationality in order to explain economic (and other) mistakes. (shrink)

If fractional-reserve demand deposits are common, and illegitimate, an obvious flaw in the banking system is exposed. However, this article maintains that the only reason why demand deposits may be considered illegitimate is because of a way of defining them that renders them almost irrelevant. This article provides a response to Bagus et al., and identifies examples of how they misrepresent Evans. It also provides further considerations on the tradeoffs relating to the availability of a deposit; methodological subjectivism; and the (...) potential for hybrid contracts. Deposit and loan contracts may be hard to mix, but the actual results of doing so should not be ignored. (shrink)

Jean-Baptiste Say is largely forgotten in modern economics; if he is remembered and studied, it is for Say’s Law, which was misinterpreted by John Maynard Keynes, and ended up providing the basis for the General Theory. In this chapter, we review Say’s Law and a more correct interpretation. We then use this to highlight the contributions of Say to modern macroeconomics, the microfoundations of macroeconomics, and entrepreneurship theory. Say was an influential French thinker – modern classical liberalism owes much to (...) him, and would be enriched by a rediscovery of his writings. (shrink)