The reference to man as animal rationale has traditionally been used to highlight rationality as marking a qualitative gap between human beings and animals. This assumption has been questioned in a similar way by the approaches of Alasdair MacIntyre and John Dewey, who agree that before we can make adequate sense of man’s rationality, we have to draw attention to animality as the common trait of human and nonhuman living beings. However, while MacIntyre takes human dependence to show ‘why human (...) beings need the virtues,’ Dewey considers it as a starting point to argue for the necessity of what he calls ‘natural piety.’ In my paper I shall elaborate some implications of this difference, guided by the question whether Dewey’s answer contributes to a re-invention of religious categories into the naturalistic view on rationality and morality. (shrink)

Verschwindet die Religiosität in der Moderne oder ist im Gegenteil eine Rückkehr der Religionen zu verzeichnen? Das Handbuch beleuchtet die Dialektik von Säkularisierung und Revitalisierung der Religionen aus philosophischer, soziologischer und religionswissenschaftlicher Perspektive. Vorgestellt werden grundlegende Konzepte, z. B. von Durkheim, Weber, Habermas, Blumenberg und Luhmann. Der zweite Teil untersucht Begriffe wie das Böse, das Heilige, Pluralismus etc. in ihrer Bedeutung im Kontext der Säkularisierung. Abschließend geht es um Konflikte wie Glauben und Wissen, Religion und Menschenrechte oder Säkularisierung und die (...) Weltreligionen. (shrink)

The reference to man as animal rationale has traditionally been used to highlight rationality as marking a qualitative gap between human beings and animals. This assumption has been questioned in a similar way by the approaches of Alasdair MacIntyre and John Dewey, who agree that before we can make adequate sense of man’s rationality, we have to draw attention to animality as the common trait of human and nonhuman living beings. However, while MacIntyre takes human dependence to show ‘why human (...) beings need the virtues,’ Dewey considers it as a starting point to argue for the necessity of what he calls ‘natural piety.’ In my paper I shall elaborate some implications of this di_erence, guided by the question whether Dewey’s answer contributes to a re-invention of religious categories into the naturalistic view on rationality and morality. (shrink)

The reference to man as animal rationale has traditionally been used to highlight rationality as marking a qualitative gap between human beings and animals. This assumption has been questioned in a similar way by the approaches of Alasdair MacIntyre and John Dewey, who agree that before we can make adequate sense of man’s rationality, we have to draw attention to animality as the common trait of human and nonhuman living beings. However, while MacIntyre takes human dependence to show ‘why human (...) beings need the virtues,’ Dewey considers it as a starting point to argue for the necessity of what he calls ‘natural piety.’ In my paper I shall elaborate some implications of this di_erence, guided by the question whether Dewey’s answer contributes to a re-invention of religious categories into the naturalistic view on rationality and morality. (shrink)