The conventional wisdom holds that U.S. political institutions are inhospitable to industrial policy. The authors call the conventional wisdom into question by making four claims: the activities targeted by industrial policy are increasingly governed by decentralized production networks rather than markets or hierarchies, “network failures” are therefore no less threatening to industrial dynamism than market or organizational failures, the spatial and organizational decentralization of production have simultaneously increased the demand and broadened the support for American industrial policy, and political decentralization (...) is therefore likely to improve the functioning of industrial policies designed to combat network failures. (shrink)

Do activist trade and industrial policies offer developing countries a viable alternative to either neoliberal or mercantilist development regimes? We hope to answer the question by, first, distinguishing the “open economy industrial policies” in vogue today from either their “closed economy” predecessors—i.e., import-substituting industrialization—or more orthodox approaches to development policy making; second, tracing the growth of nontraditional exports from Latin America and the Caribbean to the diffusion of more active approaches in the 1990s; and, third, accounting for activism’s apparent success (...) in an otherwise inauspicious spatial and temporal context by identifying three distinct limits to rent-seeking in the open economy: infant exporter maturation; the costs of government support; and the reactions of foreign rivals. (shrink)

The United States' failed effort to impose an East Asian-style, export-led industrial development regime on the Dominican Republic in the aftermath of the 1965 “Dominican crisis” poses two related empirical puzzles. First, why did the Dominicans reject the widely praised and ultimately rather successful East Asian model? And, second, how did the Dominicans overrule their erstwhile North American overlords? I answer the first question by underscoring the incompatibility of export-led industrialization and the island nation’s prevailing system of patrimonial rule. I (...) answer the second question by illuminating the patrimonial regime's “asymmetrical” desire for independence. And I thereby suggest that the social and political underpinnings of successful export-led industrialization are decidedly more restrictive than the mainstream social science literature would have us believe. (shrink)

This article introduces the special issue on “Rewarding Regulation in Latin America” by explaining the origins and potential value of the concept. It pays particularly careful attention to the limits of both regulation, as traditionally practiced, and deregulation in developing democracies today. And it briefly describes the individual contributions to the issue and summarizes their broader lessons.