Prispevek kritično obravnava znano Bobbievo tridelbo pravnega pozitivizma na pozitivizem kot splošni pristop k učenju prava, nauk o pravu in ideologijo. Avtor uvodoma opozori na nekaj problemov same tridelbe, nato pa se osredotoči na Bobbievo samoopredelitev znotraj nje. Na primeru Bobbieve obravnave pojmov temeljne norme in pravila priznavanja pokaže, kako ga njegovo kasnejše zavračanje teh dveh pojmov nezavedno privede do sprejemanja pravnega pozitivizma kot nauka o pravu in pravne ideologije – ki ju je sicer zavračal. Avtor vidi razlog za (...) ta nezavedni Bobbiev zdrs predvsem v njegovi vpetosti v specifično pravnokulturno okolje, ki ga prežema notranji pogled na pravo. Ob tem predlaga, da zavrnemo tridelbo pravnega pozitivizma in ga namesto tega proučujemo kot skupek ne vedno ločljivih stališč, ki tvorijo specifično pravnokulturno okolje. (shrink)

Članek obravnava Hartovo pojmovanje obveznosti spoštovati zakon kot temeljne razlikovalne poteze glede na tradicionalni pravni pozitivizem in jusnaturalizem. Zahteva spoštovati zakon je po Hartu utemeljena v strukturi prava samega, v sekundarnih pravilih, predvsem v pravilu za prepoznavo kot temelju vseh drugih zakonskih norm.

This article addresses a pertinent challenge to Scandinavian realism which follows from the widespread perception that the fundamental philosophical premises on which the movement relies, are no longer tenable. Focusing on Alf Ross’s version of Scandinavian realism which has often been at the centre of critical attention, the author argues that Ross’s theory can survive the fall of logical positivism through an exercise of philosophical reconstruction. More specifically, he claims that it is possible to dismount Ross’s realist legal theory almost (...) intact from its commitments to logical positivism and embed it into an alternative naturalist philosophical program that is currently very strong in contemporary philosophy. In so doing, the author applies a narrow Quinean conception of naturalism, also known as replacement naturalism, which differs from a broader inclusive conception which has been applied by other scholars in the field but which leaves the philosophical crisis of Scandinavian realism unsolved. (shrink)

Autor tvrdi da je odnos između jusnaturalizma i pravnog pozitivizma višeslojan te da je isključujuć u samo jednom pogledu. Kako bi to pokazao, raspravu započinje razlikovanjem triju shvaćanja prirodnog prava i pravnog pozitivizma, tj. kao ideologija, teorija i načina izučavanja prava. Potom ukazuje na to da su jusnaturalizam i pravni pozitivizam suprotni samo kao ideologije. Konačno, autor upozorava na brzoplete karakterizacije pojedinih autora kao jusnaturalista ili pravnih pozitivista – njihova karakterizacija, na kraju, ovisi o tome ocjenjujemo li njihovu ideologiju, teoriju (...) ili metodologiju. | Ovaj je prijevod objavljen prvotno u knjizi: Norberto Bobbio, Eseji iz teorije prava. (shrink)

Si la doctrine française dite classique ne doit rien aux réalistes scandinaves, ces derniers connaissaient ces auteurs et les citaient – généralement pour contester soit leur jusnaturalisme soit leur positivisme. Deux auteurs français retiennent particulièrement l’attention : Duguit et Carré de Malberg. L’un se disait réaliste, au sens sociologique, mais son réalisme n’a que le nom de commun avec celui des auteurs scandinaves. Le second s’est toujours réclamé du positivisme mais curieusement c’est chez lui qu’on peut trouver le plus de (...) proximité avec les réalistes scandinaves. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depends upon agreement among officials, have difficulties to make sense of the fact that lawyers frequently disagree. I first present the main arguments in the debate. I then go on to distinguish different levels at which lawyers disagree. Taking these (...) levels into consideration, I articulate a pluralist reply that shows that the fundamental positivist tenets remain untouched by Dworkin’s challenge. (shrink)

U ovome radu zagovaram stajalište koje uključni pozitivisti dijele s Ronaldom Dworkinom. Prema tezi o uključenosti morala , logički je moguće da pravni sustav uključuje moralne kriterije pravnosti . Do ovoga trenutka rasprava je uvijek imala oblik napada na koherentnost TUM-a, pri čemu su branitelji TUM-a samo pokušavali osporiti napadajući argument. Ja u prilog TUM-u iznosim pozitivan argument, koji započinjem objašnjenjem logike dokazivanja mogućnosnih tvrdnji kao što je to TUM. Pritome na samom početku vrijedi istaknuti da se logika dokazivanja mogućnosnih (...) tvrdnji umnogome razlikuje od logike dokazivanja kontingentnih deskriptivnih tvrdnji ili nužnih tvrdnji. Zbog toga će ovdje biti potrebno dati neka pojašnjenja važnih obilježja semantike modalne logike. Nakon prikladne razrade strukturnog okvira, argument u prilog TUM-a bit će zasnovan na iznenađujuće jednostavnom mislenom eksperimentu. Zapravo, argument pronalazi svoje nadahnuće u Razovom argumentu u prilog mogućnosti postojanja pravnog sustava koji se ne temelji na prisilnoj mašineriji izvršavanja prava; prema njemu, društvo anđela i dalje bi imalo sustav prava, iako u tom sustavu ne bi postojala prisilna mašinerija. Moj argument sadržavat će dvije teorijski važne značajke koje sadrži i Razov snažno jednostavan, ali u konačnici neuspješan argument. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a view that inclusive positivists share with Ronald Dworkin. According to the Moral Incorporation Thesis (MIT), it is logically possible for a legal system to incorporate moral criteria of legality (or “grounds of law,” as Dworkin puts it). Up to this point, the debate has taken the shape of attacks on the coherence of MIT with the defender of MIT merely attempting to refute the attacking argument. I give a positive argument for MIT. I (...) begin with an explanation of the logic of establishing possibility claims, such as MIT. At the outset, it is worth noting that the logic of establishing possibility claims is very different from the logic of establishing contingent descriptive claims or necessary claims. For this reason, some explication of the relevant features of the semantics of modal logic will be necessary here. Once the structural framework is adequately developed, the argument for MIT will be grounded on the strength of a thought experiment of a surprisingly simple kind. Indeed, the argument is inspired by a Razian argument for the possibility of a legal system without coercive enforcement machinery; on his view, a society of angels could still have a system of law without any coercive machinery. My argument will possess two theoretically important qualities that are also possessed by Raz’s powerfully simple, but ultimately unsuccessful, argument. (shrink)