The Jaina _saptabhaṅgī_ (seven angles of analysis or types of sentences) has drawn the attention of non-classical logicians due to its unique use of negation, contradiction, and _avaktavya_ (‘unutterable’). In its most basic structure, the _saptabhaṅgī_ appears as: (i) in a certain sense, _P_; (ii) in a certain sense, not _P_; (iii) in a certain sense, _P_ and not _P_; (iv) in a certain sense, inexpressibility of _P_; (v) in a certain sense, _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vi) in a (...) certain sense, not _P_ and inexpressibility of _P_; (vii) in a certain sense, _P_, not _P_, and inexpressibility of _P_. This appearance has led many (e.g., Ganeri and Priest) to claim that the _saptabhaṅgī_ supports non-classical systems of logic, but such a reading is contested by Balcerowicz. Focusing on Vādidevasūri’s (12th c. CE) and Yaśovijaya’s (17th c. CE) accounts of the _saptabhaṅgī_, this paper puts forward a formalization of the _saptabhaṅgī_ that brings together the non-classical views and Balcerowicz’s view through relating the _saptabhaṅgī_ to the Buddhist unanswerable questions. (shrink)