Among Singularists, it has been widely accepted that one can have singular thought by acquaintance, and that acquaintance encompasses the perceptual acquiring, memorizing and communicating of singular thoughts. I defend the possibility of having a singular thought via extending acquaintance to intermediaries other than just through written and spoken words. On my account, singular thought includes two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representation and indexical-discursive representation. Also, it is determined by two constraints: (i) the acquaintance constraint: singular thought includes a (...) causal-historical relation to the object; and (ii) the cognitive significance constraint: we have a cognitive capacity to deliberately encode an indexical-iconic representation into an indexical-discursive representation, which enables us to have a singular thought. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to examine how Kent Bach's theory of singular thought about material objects meets the requirements of transmitting de re thought. I identify a certain possible paradox haunting Bach's move of extending acquaintance in order to widen the scope of singular thought and I attempt to answer this possible paradox. First, I briefly present the manner in which Bach motivates extended acquaintance and which constraints he puts on it. I then address the problem of the (...) sorites paradox which might lead not only to Bach's communication-based de re thoughts, but perception-based de re thoughts in general, thus defined. Finally, I offer my tentative solution to the problem of extended acquaintance which consists in introducing two constraints on singular thought, namely (i) the (external) acquaintance constraint and (ii) the (internal) cognitive significance constraint, and two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representations and indexical-discursive representations which are together crucial for having a singular thought. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on Inan’s notions of propositional and objectual curiosity. Even though Inan offers an interesting and intuitive distinction between propositional and objectual curiosity, I want to question two aspects of his theory of curiosity. One aspect concerns his thesis that propositional curiosity is interdependent on epistemic attitudes such as belief, certainty and interest. Another aspect of his theory that I discuss is his thesis that objectual curiosity is not reducible to propositional curiosity. In more detail, in (...) the fi rst part, I start off by explaining what propositional curiosity is according to Inan and I bring up two worries that I call: (i) over-complexity as a result of subjectivity and (ii) overcomplexity as a result of dynamics for the above mentioned epistemic attitudes. Both worries stress the problem of over-complexity of Inan’s theory of propositional curiosity. In the second part, I argue that objectual curiosity is, contrary to Inan’s hypothesis, reducible to propositional curiosity. I further argue that the object of wh- questions that, according to Inan, express objectual curiosity can either be about the truth value of general or singular proposition. In addition, I suggest that only the reading where wh- questions express curiosity in a form of de re reading and have a singular proposition as their content is the one that is compatible with Inan’s notion of objectual curiosity. (shrink)

We all think we know who Batman and Superman are. They are polar opposites who both happen to wear their underwear over spandex pants, or at least they once did. So, for comic purists and fans of the cinematic DC Universe it may seem bold to claim that Batman is a true superhero and that Superman is not a true superhero. As a matter of a fact, we want to claim something even stronger: something we will prove independently, without only (...) comparing them and without having to worry if one comic character happens to depend on the other. We plan to demonstrate that it is not a matter of comparison between Batman and Superman when it comes to the concept: a true superhero. There is something else that is crucial for each comic character that makes one a true superhero, whereas the other is not—and we are going to reveal what this is exactly. (shrink)

The effective dynamics of quarks is described by a nonperturbatively regularized NJL model equation with canonical quantization and probability interpretation. The quantum theory of this model is formulated in functional space and the gluons are considered as relativistic bound states of colored quark-antiquark pairs. Their wave functions are calculated as eigenstates of hardcore equations, and their effective dynamics is derived by weak mapping in functional space. This leads to the phenomenological SU(3) gauge invariant gluon equations in functional formulation, i.e., the (...) local gauge symmetry is a dynamical effect resulting from the dynamics of the quark model. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to present and discuss Miscevic's position on pejorative terms. Pejorative terms, for Miscevic, are negative hybrid social kind terms that refer directly and pick out social kinds as their referents. Despite sharing some of Miscevic's intuitions on pejorative terms, I raise three main objections to his account. First, I argue that introducing pluralistic commitments about propositions is not helpful in any way for his account. On the contrary, I show that it brings about the (...) falsity of meaning and the failure of reference. Furthermore, I point out that Miscevic is mistaken in trying to avoid the problem of co-reference between terms such as "Boche" and "German". I argue that there is no co-reference present because the referents of these two terms belong to two different social kinds. Finally, I raise a more general objection connected to the reference of social kind terms and, consequently, to pejorative terms as well. I bring up a worry that certain referential theories about pejorative terms, Miscevic's account included, might lack an explanation of what ties a social kind token to a particular social kind type. (shrink)