Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games.Caroline Berden & Hans Peters - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (4):359-370.
    Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1673 citations  
  • On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games.Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea & Hans Peters - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):367-391.
    In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under the name of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium.’ There, the players’ reference points depend on the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1225 citations  
  • Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.D. Kahneman & A. Tversky - 1979 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society:263--291.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - JSTOR.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   837 citations  
  • Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele.John von Neumann - 1928 - Mathematische Annalen 100:295--320.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Le Comportement de L’Homme Rationnel Devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de L’École Américaine.Maurice Allais - 1953 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 21:503--546.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations