Folk moral objectivism and its measurement

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 84 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Experimental philosophers and psychologists investigate whether people perceive moral judgments to be objectively true or false. Existing research focuses on a single dimension of ‘perceived objectivity’. The present research examines whether multiple dimensions of folk moral objectivity underlie moral judgments. It also examines whether such dimensions relate to perceived objectivity, tolerance, and people’s behavioral intentions to punish norm-violators. Exploratory factor analysis on twenty ethical items revealed three different ways of perceiving moral truth (Independent Truth, Universal Truth, Divine Truth), which each form reliable subscales (Study 1). This three-factor structure was supported by confirmatory factor analysis (Study 2). Each of the dimensions is differently related to perceived objectivity (Study 3). With respect to tolerance, perceived objectivity is a mediator in the relationship between perceiving moral truth as absolute or universal and tolerance (Study 4). With respect to a willingness to harm measure, Independent Truth is negatively related and Universal Truth is positively related, to people’s punitive attitudes toward norm-violators.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others.Geoffrey Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1):250-256.
The Objectivity of Truth, Morality, and Beauty.Steven James Bartlett - 2017 - Willamette University Faculty Research Website.
Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Moral skepticisms. New York: Oxford University Press.
Exploring Metaethical Commitments: Moral Objectivity and Moral Progress.Kevin Uttich, George Tsai & Tania Lombrozo - 2014 - In Hagop Sarkissian & Jennifer Cole Wright (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 188-208.
Truth‐Aptitude.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009-04-10 - In Marcia Baron & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 259–288.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-07

Downloads
787 (#1,586)

6 months
94 (#178,657)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lieuwe Zijlstra
University of Groningen

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references