Drives in Schelling: Drives as Cognitive Faculties

In Manja Kisner & Jörg Noller (eds.), The Concept of Drive in Classical German Philosophy: Between Biology, Anthropology, and Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 255-279 (2021)
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Abstract

Quite remarkably, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling uses the notion of “drive” in analysing important cognitive achievements: An important instance of this attitude can be found in his characterizing Kant as a philosopher who operates in the basis of instincts. His key argument in adopting “drives” as key to the cognitive faculties of humans derives from the conviction that cognitive endeavours need to be open and directed towards grasping reality not in individual items, but as a totality. He arrives, in employing these terms, at an understanding of science, and of cognition in general, as an open, future-directed, and dynamic process. This chapter presents an overview of Schelling’s usage of “drive”-related terms, discusses his rather detailed description of the mechanics of drives within the structure of human faculties, and draws some conclusions as to Schelling’s understanding of “science” and the dynamics of science.

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Paul Ziche
Utrecht University

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