Abstract

Contrary to Rorty’s standpoint, I try to portray such model of ontology which he accepts. Rorty, contrary to his declarations, does not exercise ontological neutrality. On the contrary, he presents a number of theses on the world, such as “the world is a brutal force that can crush us”. What is more its criticized type of ontology is the idea of pre-kantian noumenal access to the world. Rorty rejects essentialism and substantialism, however, he accepts panrelationism, according to which there are only relationships, and every object is a network of various relation in which it remains with other items. Thus, there are only intentional objects, and the relation of reference is a linguistic talking about something. Panrelationism abandons the traditional distinctions, such as essential/accidental, substance/property, appearance/reality. Model of the universe in Rorty’s panrelationism is a system of natural numbers, where the number is nothing more than usually possible to carry out algebraic operations. Therefore, panrelationism is criticized for the acceptance of linguistic idealism which tries to deviate rates ineffectively distinguishing causal and semantic relations and accepting nominalism. From this standpoint language is a tool for coping with the world, not for mirroring it. Key words UNIVERSE, MODEL