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The motion vision of the blind and the modularity of consciousness
Transactions of the Medical Society of London 112:11-18 (1996)
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Citations of this work
Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.Ruediger Vaas - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 2 (2).
Why quantum correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.Ruediger Vaas - 2001 - Informacao E Cognicao 3 (1):64-107.
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