Why rights are not optimisation requirements

Jurisprudence 10 (3):354-374 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this article I pursue the implications of the statement that constitutional rights are – as Alexy’s principles theory argues – optimisation requirements, and show that they are not. I ar...

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