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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Tolerance Among the Virtues by John R. BowlinLaura YordyTolerance Among the Virtues John R. Bowlin PRINCETON, NJ: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. 280 pp. $39.50John Bowlin has produced a comprehensive and fine-grained analysis of, and argument for, the virtue of tolerance in contemporary Western democratic societies. His account relies heavily on Thomas Aquinas, yet he believes that the case for tolerance should have force beyond Christian communities because liberal democracies are necessarily concerned about maintaining just relationships among people with different understandings of the good. This is a precise and thorough treatment of an important quality in these contentious times.Bowlin argues, first, that criticisms of tolerance often arise from mistaking the virtue for one of its semblances, typically a sort of truculent self-restraint. In response, drawing on Aquinas and Wittgenstein, he makes an extended case for true tolerance as part of the virtue of justice. Tolerance is necessary to any human life ("natural" in Aquinas' terms) because of the social nature of humanity and the inevitable rise of interpersonal or intergroup differences. The virtue consists of "patient endurance of objectionable difference" for the sake of peaceful society and shared autonomy (130). Peaceful society and autonomy are goods shared in common by members of a democratic society, and so all are owed tolerance in respect of that membership. Obviously, not all differences should be tolerated. Tolerance as a virtue includes the ability to distinguish between what is truly objectionable and what is not, along with between what is objectionable and what is unendurable. The accuracy of these distinctions, of course, depends on circumstances and context.When Bowlin returns to the issue of opposition to tolerance (chap. 5), he points out that disputes about tolerance are actually often about a particular community's lists of what is tolerable and what is not. Tolerance, therefore, is not a possession of either the political right or left, for any human group develops and exercises tolerance for some of the inevitable differences among its members. Rather, the right and the left cling to different lists of what is properly tolerated. This section of the book seems particularly helpful, as it provides an instructive perspective on differences that often seem unfathomable.Finally, Bowlin discusses the relationship between "(1) tolerance annexed to justice and acquired by natural means; (2) forbearance as a perfection of friendship's love; and (3) a forbearance that, by Christian confession, comes by grace, expresses God's love, and participates in God's life" (207). Drawing [End Page 189] on Paul here, Bowlin asserts that though natural tolerance has limits, gracious forbearance—grounded in love—does not. Even if sinners must be restrained by just coercion, they must at the same time be patiently endured while their forbearing community hopes for their transformation through grace.Bowlin has written a strong argument for tolerance as an important virtue. The latter chapters are broadly accessible, whereas the earlier sections require at least some familiarity with Thomistic assumptions and methods. This is an excellent contribution to virtue ethics, political theology, and scholarship on pluralism and democracy.Laura YordyBridgewater CollegeCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics...