Abstract

This dissertation is a study of Kohlberg's moral psychology, which is a six-stage model of moral development. Kohlberg claims that his stages form a universal invariant sequence and that they are hierarchical, i.e., higher stages are better than lower stages. Accordingly, he claims that Stage 6 morality, which centers on justice, is universally valid. This ethic of justice is embodied mainly in respect for persons, fairness, and the procedural principle of ideal role taking. Kohlberg claims not only that Stage 6 values and principles are universally valid, but also that they are determinate. In other words, reasoning in terms of these values and principles guarantees that, for each particular moral problem, there will be a distinct solution on which all morally mature people could agree. By making these claims Kohlberg is advocating a strong and traditional version of universalism, which I call 'paradigm universalism.' ;The dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters I outline Kohlberg's theory and explore its philosophical implications. In Chapter 3 I discuss Kohlberg's debates with two important critics, Gilligan and Flanagan. Gilligan claims that Kohlberg's emphasis on justice rather than care indicates a gender bias in his model. Flanagan, on the other hand, argues that since morality is multifarious it is wrong to equate morality either with justice or care of a combination of both. While these criticisms do point out certain shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory, I argue that they do not seriously threaten the universal validity of Stage 6 moralvalues and principles in general. Chapter 4 introduces the main philosophical arguments of this dissertation. In this chapter I argue that moral psychology is relevant to moral philosophy; that the claim of hierarchy for the Kohlbergian stages does receive significant support from his research; and therefore; Stage 6 does plausibly reflect certain universal moral ideals. At the same time I allow; that there is clearly certain cultural bias in Kohlberg's theory and that he is excessively optimistic about the determinacy of Stage 6 moral reasoning. In the final Chapter, I reflect on the universalism-relativism. debate in light of Kohlberg's theory. I argue that paradigm universalism is too strong for Kohlberg to support, and that universalism is acceptable only in a weakened form which I call 'minimal universalism.' Contrary to the hope of paradigm universalists, this minimal universalism cannot serve as a comprehensive theory for solving moral problems. Neither does it exclude all forms of ethical relativism, but it does set important limits to any acceptable relativist theory