Abstract

My aim, in this paper, is to demonstrate that Nussbaum’s cognitivism ignores a ‘feeling’ component. Although Nussbaum tries to address the feeling component by distinguishing two kinds of feelings, one with a rich intentional or cognitive content, and the other lacking such content, she downplays the feeling component. She claims that the latter kind of feeling is neither necessary nor sufficient for emotions, while feelings of the former kind, which she claims are ‘terminological variations’ of perceptions and judgments, are necessary but not sufficient. Furthermore, she holds that the occurrence of noncognitive characteristics in emotional experiences is contingent to the definition of emotions. Hence she claims that emotions can be defined in terms of the cognitive evaluative element only. However, if this is true, I argue, Nussbaum must explain what ‘affect’ is and whether it can be fairly contrasted with cognition. If she cannot do this, I argue, her cognitivism remains distinctly unsatisfying