Fodor's epistemic intuitions of analyticity

Sorites 14 (October):110-116 (2002)
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Abstract

Semantic holism has it that the semantic properties of an individual expression are determined by that expression

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Wayne Wright
California State University, Long Beach

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References found in this work

From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

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