Could I Conceive Being a Brain in a Vat? JOHN D. COLLIER This article accepts the premises of Putnam's notorious argument that we could not be a brain in a vat, and argues that even this allows a robust (although relativistic) form of realism. The strategy is to distin-guish between our ability to state a theory and our ability to conceive the

International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2) (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Could I conceive being a brain in a vat?John D. Collier - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):413 – 419.
Conceiving one's envatment while denying metaphysical realism.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):469 – 474.
Magic, semantics, and Putnam’s vat brains.Mark Sprevak & Christina Mcleish - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):227-236.
Re: Brains in a vat.Stephen Hetherington - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (4):307–312.
Re: Brains in a Vat.Stephen Hetherington - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (4):307-312.
Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.
The brain in the vat and the question of metaphysical realism.J. Smart - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):237-247.
Semantic Pragmatism and A Priori Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455-480.
Brains in a VAT and memory: How (not) to respond to Putnam's argument.Tim Kraft - 2020 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (33):39-53.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-07

Downloads
18 (#201,463)

6 months
5 (#1,552,255)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references