If I am a brain in a vat, then I am not a brain in a vat

Mind 101 (401):123-128 (1992)
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Abstract

Massimo Dell'Utri (1990) provides a reconstruction of Hilary Putnam's argument (1981, chapter 1) to show that the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. I will explain why the argument Dell'Utri offers us is, on the face of it, quite problematic. Then I will provide a way out of the difficulty.

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Citations of this work

Brains in vats and model theory.Tim Button - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.
A butterfly dream in a brain in a vat.Xiaoqiang Han - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):157-167.
The structure of instrumental practical reasoning.Christian Miller - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1–40.
Externalism and Scepticism.Keith Butler - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.

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