A non-epistemic, non-pictorial, internal, material visual field

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1010-1011 (2001)
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Abstract

The authors O'Regan & Noë (O&N) have ignored the case for the visual field as being non-epistemic evidence internal to the brain, having no pictorial similarity to the external input, and being material in ontological status. They are also not aware of the case for the evolutionary advantage of learning as the perceptual refashioning of such non-epistemic sensory evidence via motivated feedback in sensorimotor activity.

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