Abstract

Psychological happiness can be defined as a profound state of mind which figures strongly in our prudential evaluations and deliberations. I believe that current theories of happiness describe a state of mind that is either ubiquitous, but not as profound as we take happiness to be, or profound, but not as ubiquitous as we take happiness to be. The most plausible theory of psychological happiness currently on offer – the affective state theory – is inadequate in that it fails to make the right distinction between those affects that contribute towards happiness and those that do not contribute towards happiness. I believe that the correct distinction between happiness-constituting affects and non-happiness-constituting affects is that only affects based on a person’s values are happiness-constituting; it is the relationship between happiness and our values that makes happiness so prudentially valuable. A complete theory of happiness must provide an account of how psychological happiness relates to our prudential values. In this paper I begin to develop the sentiment satisfaction theory of psychological happiness, which is the view that happiness is constituted by affects based on our values, and that our values are constituted by our sentiments. Sentiments are dispositions to experience various emotions and moods; the emotions and moods that are caused by our sentiments can be viewed as expressions of our sentiments. Positive emotions and moods constitute sentiment satisfaction; negative emotions and moods constitute sentiment frustration. I suggest, then, that we can view happiness as consisting in the positive emotions and moods that constitute sentiment satisfaction. Furthermore, instances of sentiment satisfaction are tied together by our underlying emotional dispositions and the effect that emotions have on our motivation towards further instances of sentiment satisfaction.