Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (1):95-113 (2005)

Chase Wrenn
University of Alabama
C. S. Peirce once defined pragmatism as the opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: ‘Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’ (Peirce 1982a: 48) More succinctly, Richard Rorty has described the position in this way.
Keywords pragmatism  truth  goal of inquiry  Rorty
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DOI 10.1163/18758185-90000004
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References found in this work BETA

The Fixation of Belief.Charles S. Peirce - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 37-49.

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A Puzzle About Desire.Chase B. Wrenn - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.

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