Opposites are the outcome of a process of opposing. This process, by which opposites are generated--and also, it will presently appear, united--dialectic calls negation. Thus negation is a central concept in dialectic, for it describes something which is even more ultimate than the opposites themselves. It has several aspects.

The structure and the energies are mutually relevant, in that each makes the other determinate. Without the social energies, the political forms of democracy are abstract and indeterminate; they lose their reference to the individual society, and there is left a structure which might be exemplified in any number of states, in any number of different ways. But in relation to the energies, the determinable structures become individualized, determinate forms. Conversely, apart from structure, the energies are indeterminate. Thus we say (...) of a man that his originality or ambition took a certain form. His creative powers found an outlet in science or in art; his ambition was channelled in a political career, or he became a business executive. Because of the mutual determination of structure and energies, the existent is an individual, and acts as a unit. (shrink)

The rule for the determination of clear meaning was stated by Peirce in these words: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object". The idea of an object is the idea of its effects, of what it will do, and of what will happen to it, under various conditions. The idea or conception is a definition, (...) or a set of properties and relationships. In a more extended sense, it is also the set of implications which, as we say, follow from its definition. (shrink)

Scientific method in philosophy has been so greatly developed and widely accepted in our day that it seems almost ready to lay claim to the self-evidence which an older rationalism professed. It is my belief that it leaves out something essential to philosophy. I shall not attempt to define scientific method in philosophy, since it is a movement with several wings, rather than a definite set of propositions accepted by all its advocates; but its intent is clear. The theme of (...) current criticisms of metaphysics and speculation has been that philosophy has no private access to the truth, no monopoly of such knowledge as human beings possess; it stands on an equal footing with the sciences. The observation is sound and timely; but from it has been drawn, at least by implication, the conclusion that there is no such thing as philosophy at all. For unless it has a peculiar method, or a distinct subject matter, or some other distinguishing trait, philosophy is only a convenient name for a certain group of men and the books they wrote. The criticism was made because philosophy had come to be identified with a set of dogmas. I wish to suggest instead that it is a peculiar kind of inquiry into a distinct subject matter. Philosophy is the attempt to formulate principles or categories which the philosopher already possesses, in common with everyone else, but in an unformulated state. Philosophy is always developing theories and systems, but they are tentative, not final and dogmatic; the categories are certain, but their statement is provisional; therefore, the process of inquiry is unending. (shrink)