Minimising disjunctive information

Logic and Logical Philosophy 19 (1-2):159-192 (2010)
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Abstract

In [5, 6], Belnap proposed a number of amendments to Rescher’s strategy for reasoning with maximal consistent subsets. More recently in [18], Horty explicitly endorsed Belnap’s amendment to address a related problem in handling inconsistent instructions and commands. In this paper, we’ll examine Belnap’s amendment and point out that Belnap’s suggestion in the use of conjunctive containment is open to the very objection he raised. We’ll propose a way out. The strategy turns on the use of First Degree Entailment in combination with Quine’s notion of prime implicate

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References found in this work

A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
On Inferences from Inconsistent Premises.Nicholas Rescher & Ruth Manor - 1970 - Theory and Decision 1 (2):179-217, 1970-1971.
On Cores and Prime Implicants of Truth Functions.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (2):329-330.
Frege's content-principle and relevant deducibility.Neil Tennant - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):245-258.
A new theory of content I: Basic content. [REVIEW]Ken Gemes - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):595 - 620.

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