Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Politics of Attention and the Promise of Mindfulness by Lawrence BergerKatherine WithyBERGER, Lawrence. The Politics of Attention and the Promise of Mindfulness. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. 282 pp. Cloth, $120.00In The Politics of Attention and the Promise of Mindfulness, Lawrence Berger attempts to capture the phenomenon at stake in practices of mindfulness within the theoretical framework of European phenomenology. Berger’s phenomenological inspiration is described as Heideggerian (although his conversation partners are primarily Dan Zahavi and, through him, Husserl), and the mindfulness in question is the practice of paying attention to one’s experience, including active listening to others. It is through such attentiveness that, Berger suggests, contemporary Americans can resist the degeneration of American political discourse and build a more robust political community. This is the promise and the politics of the title.The book contains nine chapters, arranged in three parts. The first part, “The Metaphysics of Attention,” sketches a phenomenological and enactivist account of attention that situates it in relation to language and embodiment while rejecting metaphysical views that give primacy to the physical in contrast to the mental. The second part, “Attention and the Self,” compares and contrasts Berger’s account of attention and mindfulness to and with proximate concepts from Husserl and Zahavi, such as introspection, prereflective and reflective self-awareness, the minimal self, the transcendental ego, and the phenomenological method. The third part, “Attention and the Political,” turns to intersubjectivity and community, mindfulness and community building, and finally to Heidegger’s later philosophy.There is some tension between the expressed aims of the text and what actually happens on the page. As the framing and the blurb make clear, the text wants to be a political intervention that takes a stand against attention capture in contemporary American politics. It also wants to be a manifesto for the value of certain practices of attention, as well as a scholarly engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy that shows its first-personal and second-personal relevance. But the text is actually an exploration of a particular intentional phenomenon—one that Berger has [End Page 707] apparently encountered in contemporary Western mindfulness practices—that attempts to show it to be central to intentionality as such and to have been largely missed by the phenomenological tradition.The core claim is that attention is how we relate to things and how we come to presence, individually and together. To be us is to be essentially open to things through attending to them, such that in that attending we fulfill our essence and show up as what we are. Such attending is either primarily or paradigmatically perceptual, and we can discuss it by discussing, for example, attending to pain, attending to the experience of tasting a lemon, or paying attention (or not) to an important conversation. Berger’s key distinction is between active attention and passive attention. Passive attention is a way of attending to entities that is immersed, sometimes habitual, sometimes dispersed, and lacking in self-awareness. It is at work when we are absorbed in what we are doing, distracted by emotions, or captured by cultural influences. Active attention is that which can be cultivated in mindfulness practices. It involves explicit self-awareness and an effort to resist distraction and to focus, filtering out extraneous stimuli. Such attention is “the foreground of engaged activity,” but it is also intentionality: our very directedness toward what is, and so something that “comes before thought, rationality, emotion, will, transcendental ego, or anything else that might be posited as the seat of human action.”The discussion ranges over multiple phenomena: our very awareness as such, intentionality itself, particular acts of perceptual focusing, the attending to experience in the phenomenological method, and the effortful awareness cultivated in mindfulness practices. This leads to some unclarity about precisely which phenomenon or phenomena Berger is trying to pin down. But one wonders whether the project’s motivation is less strictly phenomenological than ethico-phenomenological. When Berger criticizes Zahavi for simply missing the phenomenon of attention, he describes Zahavi’s position as aiming to “[resolve] some philosophical problems” but unable to tell the story that Berger wants to tell about attention...