Abstract

Hugh Baxter’s book Habermas: A Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy not only carefully recounts Habermas’ political and legal theory, but also raises several insightful criticisms of Habermas. Of particular note is Baxter’s criticism of Habermas’ system–lifeworld model originally presented in Theory of Communicative Action. Baxter argues that Habermas ought to discard the concept of the lifeworld because the distinction between lifeworld and system is no longer tenable in the model of political power presented in Habermas’ later work, Between Facts and Norms, which focuses more explicitly on law as a social system. Baxter contends that the lifeworld, which Habermas describes as those parts of our lives that are structured by communicative action and shared norms, is an unhelpful way of understanding our social world because, in reality, most of our interactions are structured both by communicative norms and by the strategic action typical of ‘the system’. I argue, however, that Habermas must retain the theoretical distinction between system and lifeworld, though in everyday practice they are not so neatly disentangled, because without such an element there would be no source of legitimacy for the law. Without a connection to the communicative action of the lifeworld, law and the political structure would be nothing but strategic action