Conceiving Something Without Any Conceptual Scheme

The Owl of Minerva 18 (1):13-28 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What it is to be determinate, to have quality, to be something, hardly appears to be a problem worthy of thought. How could anything be more self-evident or familiar or resistant to questioning? It seems virtually impossible to be unacquainted with the category of something, whether in reality or in thought or speech. To encounter anything real at all is to encounter something, whereas to think or speak any intelligible content is already to refer to something thought or spoken. Indeed, it is unimaginable how one could fail to understand something, since if one did lack all notion of something there would be nothing determinate to understand or encounter.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Three models of conceptual schemes.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.
Subjetless Change Revisted.Xiaoqiang Han - 2008 - E – L O G O S 1211:24.
Why conceptual schemes?Maria Baghramian - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):287–306.
Sensory experience, perceptual evidence and conceptual frameworks.Emmett L. Holman - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):99-108.
Knowledge versus survival.Herman Tennessen - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):407 – 414.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-18

Downloads
49 (#323,022)

6 months
6 (#507,808)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Winfield
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references