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The presidential address I—armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1–23 (2005)
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Citations of this work
A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds.Jonathan D. Jacobs - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):227-248.
Saving the doxastic account of intuitions.Christian Nimtz - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):357-375.
References found in this work
Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
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