Abstract

This dissertation has as its focus a tension at the heart of Descartes' theory of the passions, one which defines and therefore problematizes his final ethic. As he sees it, the passions can both contribute to our good and prevent us from seeing it perspicuously. It is not so much the presence of this tension itself in Descartes' thinking which is noteworthy---the tension is an old one in the history of philosophy---but his epistemological treatment of it, the fact that it emerges within and can only be resolved through the new philosophy of ideas. I explore this fundamental tension as it relates to two closely related themes, both of which are of major importance to Descartes throughout his career. The first is the problem of knowledge or truth, the second that of freedom. As I argue, the account of freedom in Meditation Four is canonical for Descartes. This means that the ideal formal relation between intellect and will which that account lays down applies in all spheres of prospective knowledge acquisition---from metaphysics to morals. ;The intersection of truth and freedom in Meditation Four is well-known: only when the will's operations are spontaneously directed by the "light" of the intellect can our beliefs or actions be fully free. However, Descartes' mature ethic, contained almost exclusively in The Passions of the Soul, presents that doctrine of freedom with a good deal of conceptual trouble. For although it is quite clear what the object of moral knowledge is---the good of the composite self---it remains difficult to specify exactly how the passions can reveal this object for what it univocally is. This is, I claim, due to the inherent "opacity" of passion-ideas, their irreducibly problematic status as representational entities. They are, it would seem, both the only means to self-knowledge and moral freedom and a persistent hindrance to this dual ideal. ;Nevertheless, with the concept of generosity, Descartes claims to offer us a clear picture of what it means to achieve the ideal. The criterion of self-knowledge employed by the generous agent is that of "control": she is aware of the degree of control she is capable of exercising over people and things external to herself, and she structures her desires accordingly. But this result is, allegedly, not obtained at the cost of suppressing the passions. The generous agent thus combines, in optimal measures, the pleasures afforded by the passions with full rational control of the will. ;I close with some sceptical reflections on the ideal of generosity thus construed