Abstract

A fundamental and bold claim of Portmann’s philosophy of biology is a thesis about the autonomy of self-representation of all living beings: “Self-presentation has to be understood as a basic fact of life, on a par with self-maintenance and the preservation of the species.” In other words, the perceivable appearance of organisms cannot be reduced to its chemical, physiological, morphological or functional causes, but must be understood as a phenomenon in its own right. The aim of the following contribution is threefold. First, it aims at establishing the relevant context for the bold claim by embedding the claim in Portmann’s broader view of biology. Secondly, it aims at reconstructing Portmann’s rather scattered argument for the bold claim by recasting it as an appeal to what Portmann calls “unaddressed authentic appearances”. Finally, it presents Portmann’s partly phenomenological approach to biological phenomena as a reluctant relative of Goethe’s approach, thereby claiming that Portmann is no advocate of a genuine Goethean science of nature.