Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion

Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166 (1994)
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John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Assertion, knowledge and predictions.Matthew Benton - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):102-105.

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References found in this work

A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..
Meaning, communication, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1980 - In Z. Van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
Moore's Paradox: One or Two?J. N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141 - 142.
Moore's Paradox, Assertion and Knowledge.O. R. Jones - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):183 - 186.
Believing the Self-Contradictory.John N. Williams - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):279 - 285.

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