Moore-paradoxical Assertion and Fully Conscious Belief

Abstract

Sidney Shoemaker has given an influential explanation of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief in terms of conscious belief. Here I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
Moore's many paradoxes.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.
Conscious belief.D. H. Mellor - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:87-101.
Assertion and belief.Charles Sayward - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-02

Downloads
18 (#811,325)

6 months
3 (#992,474)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references