Beliefs, Points of View, and Multiple Environments

Cognitive Science 7 (2):95-119 (1983)
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Abstract

The paper describes a system for dealing with nestings of belief in terms of the mechanism of computational environment. A method is offered for computing the beliefs of A about B (and so on) in terms of the systems existing knowledge structures about A and B separately. A proposal for belief percolation is put forward: percolation being a side effect of the process of the computation of nested beliefs, but one which could explain the acquisition of unsupported beliefs. It is argued that the mechanism proposed is compatible with a general least effort hypothesis concerning human mental functioning

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References found in this work

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Definite Knowledge and Mutual Knowledge.Herbert H. Clark & Catherine R. Marshall - 1981 - In Aravind K. Joshi, Bonnie L. Webber & Ivan A. Sag (eds.), Elements of Discourse Understanding. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 10–63.
Making preferences more active.Yorick Wilks - 1978 - Artificial Intelligence 11 (3):197-223.
On the use of framed knowledge in language comprehension.Eugene Charniak - 1978 - Artificial Intelligence 11 (3):225-265.

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