Abstract

It has normally been assumed that whatever empirical and metaphysical problems it may raise, mind-body dualism would satisfy a number of deeply engrained intuitions about the mental for which nondualist theories have no plausible account. In what follows I shall argue that this is true only for a special class of dualist theories. I distinguish transcendental dualism from the other forms that dualist theories may take. And I argue that where the intuitions about subjectivity that have seemed to motivate and support dualism are concerned, only transcendental dualism has an advantage over nondualist theories; nontranscendental versions of dualism are open to the same objections that have made nondualist accounts of the mind seem implausible. Moreover, I argue that the usual objections to transcendental dualism are inconclusive. I shall argue, however, that with regard to a crucial intuition concerning the subjective point of view - that we have a form of privileged access to our own qualitative mental states - transcendental dualism is at a disadvantage relative to some nondualist and nontranscendental theories. And I shall argue that if a theory fails to satisfy this intuition, its other advantages carry very little weight. Thus I claim that transcendental versions of dualism do not offer viable alternatives to nontranscendental theories of mind.