- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850 (2012)
Abstract
Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org [2] (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org [3] (no proxy)
- bjps.oxfordjournals.org [4] (no proxy)
- philsci-archive.pitt.edu
(no proxy) - philsci-archive.pitt.edu [2] (no proxy)
- jstor.org (no proxy)
- academic.oup.com (no proxy)
- journals.uchicago.edu (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Calibration and Convexity: Response to Gregory Wheeler.Jon Williamson - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):851-857.
Uncertainty, credal sets and second order probability.Jonas Clausen Mork - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):353-378.
Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology.Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier.
Extensions of expected utility theory and some limitations of pairwise comparisons.Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 609-620.
Should physicians be bayesian agents?M. Wayne Cooper - 1992 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 13 (4).
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-07-28
Downloads
149 (#123,796)
6 months
23 (#116,739)
2011-07-28
Downloads
149 (#123,796)
6 months
23 (#116,739)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.
Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.
Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitat
References found in this work
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-qd5ph uwo