Integrating the parts of the biopsychosocial model

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 321-326 (2007)
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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Integrating the Parts of the Biopsychosocial ModelMichael A. Westerman (bio)Keywordsbiopsychosocial approach, pragmatism, participatory framework, functionalist accounts, mind-body-behavior integrationEngel’s (1977, 1980) call for replacing the biomedical model with his biopsychosocial approach pointed in the right direction. Bradley Lewis recognizes this, but argues that Engel’s framework does not provide us with everything we need to develop the biopsychosocial approach. Lewis attempts to add what is missing by reinterpreting Engel as a pragmatist. As I see it, he is on the right track. We need to add something more to Engel’s position, and Lewis’s reinterpretation is an intriguing attempt to respond to this need. Nevertheless, I believe Lewis’s article only takes us so far. Something is still missing. In what follows, I identify what is missing, make suggestions about additional steps we can take to remedy the situation, and raise the possibility that pragmatism can be helpful in this venture in ways that Lewis does not consider.It should come as no surprise that it will take a lot to accomplish Engel’s objectives, because those goals are extremely ambitious. For one thing, Engel offered his biopsychosocial model as an alternative framework for all of medicine, not just psychiatry. Furthermore, he believed that it was not enough to augment the technological focus of the biomedical model by simply tacking onto it more humane concern with the patient as a person and more attention to the patient–physician relationship (although he certainly advocated changes along those lines). Engel maintained that psychosocial factors play an intrinsic role in the etiology of disease, its assessment, and treatment. He based his biopsychosocial model on general systems theory because he believed that it provides a framework for dealing with disease in a way that reflects this view.This is where Lewis enters the arena. He endorses Engel’s goal of developing a biopsychosocial approach to medicine and psychiatry, but he takes issue with Engel’s belief that we can reach this goal by following along the lines of general systems theory. Indeed, he claims that Engel’s biopsychosocial model was “doomed from the start” because of this idea. At a later point, I will turn to Lewis’s arguments against employing a systems theory framework. I first consider what Lewis proposes we bring to the biopsychosocial endeavor in its place.Lewis argues that pragmatism can get us where we want to go and that it makes sense to reinterpret Engel as a pragmatist because there [End Page 321] are a number of noteworthy similarities between pragmatism and Engel’s work. First, Lewis points out that both Engel and the pragmatists believed that inquiry should start with real problems, that is, with something that is not working. Another similarity is that, like the pragmatists, Engel believed that it is important to be aware of the impact theories and philosophical perspectives have on the ways we deal with problems, even though their influence may not be readily apparent. The third similarity Lewis points to is that even though Engel at times justifies beliefs by taking recourse to idealized notions about “The Method” of science (which, Lewis notes, parallels Peirce’s own early idealization of science), Engel ends up holding the pragmatists’ view that the justification of beliefs rests on their usefulness. Finally, Lewis argues that Engel and the pragmatists (in particular, Dewey) have similar views of nature, or the world, in that they believe nature can be characterized by a hierarchy of “levels” (Engel) or “plateaus” (Dewey).What do we gain from lewis’s reinterpretation?There is a lot to recommend this new reading of Engel. I agree with Lewis that Engel did not provide us with all the tools we need for developing his biopsychosocial approach. I also think that Lewis is right when he asserts that, in particular, we have to place Engel’s ideas about the biopsychosocial model in the context of a richer philosophical perspective. In addition, Lewis has identified a number of interesting similarities between Engel’s work and pragmatism. Hence, there is a basis for reinterpreting him as a pragmatist—and, in my opinion, this brings in a philosophical perspective that does indeed...

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