Carving the mind by its joints. Natural kinds and social construction in psychiatry

In Talmont-Kaminski K. Milkowski M. (ed.), Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 30-48 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I propound a mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the human sciences. By examining a culture- bound psychiatric disorder, bulimia nervosa, I illustrate how partially socially constructed phenomena raise a serious challenge to traditional theories of natural kinds. As a solution to the challenge, I show how the mechanistic approach allows us to include real but partly socially sustained phenomena among natural kinds. This is desirable because the theory of natural kinds supplies the human sciences with a clear normative account of concept formation. Furthermore, my theory suggests a conceptual framework for interdisciplinary research on complex phenomena. As a prerequisite for the mechanistic approach, the concept of natural kind in the philosophy of science must be distinguished from the use of the notion in other parts of philosophy

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Three Kinds of Social Kinds.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):96-112.
Diseases as natural kinds.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):347-369.
Do the Life Sciences Need Natural Kinds?Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):167-190.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-09-16

Downloads
30 (#521,181)

6 months
1 (#1,516,429)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references