Abstract

The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co‐validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double‐faced reconstruction of the legal order.