The role of pretense in the process of self-deception

Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):1-14 (2020)
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Abstract

Gendler [2007. “Self-deception as Pretense.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 : 231–258] offers an account of self-deception in terms of imaginative pretense, according to which the self-deceptive...

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10.1080/13869795.2020.1711960

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Xintong Wei
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Getting real about pretense.Daniel Hutto - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1157-1175.
Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980.Bernard Williams - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Self-Knowledge for Humans.Quassim Cassam - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge for Humans.Quassim Cassam - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.

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