I— _Alan Weir_
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):47-72 (2003)
Abstract
[Alan Weir] This paper addresses the problem of how to account for objective content-for the distinction between how we actually apply terms and the conditions in which we ought to apply them-from within a naturalistic framework. Though behaviourist or dispositionalist approaches are generally held to be unsuccessful in naturalising objective content or 'normativity', I attempt to restore the credibility of such approaches by sketching a behaviouristic programme for explicating objective content. /// [Alexander Miller] Paul Boghossian (1989, 1990) has argued, on grounds concerning the holistic nature of belief fixation, that there are principled reasons for thinking that 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism about content cannot hope to satisfy a condition of extensional accuracy. I discern three separable strands of argument in Boghossian's work-the circularity objection, the open-endedness objection, and the certification objection-and argue that each of these objections fails. My conclusion is that for all that Boghossian has shown, 'optimal conditions' versions of reductive dispositionalism have to be assessed on a case-by-case basisAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/1467-8349.00102
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Similar books and articles
Truth Through Proof: A Formalist Foundation for Mathematics.Alan Weir - 2010 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work
On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning.Ali Saboohi - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (3):513-525.