Abstract

In Anarchy, State and Utopia , Robert Nozick argues that a minimal state, the duties of which are restricted to protecting its citizens, is the only legitimate state. This essay examines Nozick's claim and presents two sorts of objections to it, that the minimal is too extensive because it violates certain moral principles, or the minimal state is not extensive enough because it fails to carry its own principles to their logical conclusions. ;The first sort of objection is based on several arguments posed by anarchist and libertarian thinkers. Mainly it is contended that Nozick mistakes the anarchist position by confounding the state of nature with a non-state anarchist society. While the latter could exist without violating moral principles, the former represents neither a stable society nor a moral paradigm. ;The second sort of objection is based on Nozick's endorsement of a "Lockean" proviso as a constraint on the acquisition of property. It is argued that even Nozick's weaker interpretation of the proviso will not secure permanent private property rights. Further, it is argued that with the adoption of an appropriate baseline for compensation of violations of the proviso, a more-than-minimal state would have to arise to implement compensation. ;The claim is then made that the relative strength of these two sorts of objections can only be appraised after the underlying moral theory is more fully formulated, either in terms of rights , in terms of freedom, or in some other way. The morality of a political system can only be judged against the background of moral theory