Abstract

The first task of political philosophy is to establish the legitimacy of the state. It is a necessary feature of the state that it coerce its citizens, yet there is a general moral presumption against coercion. The state is legitimate, therefore, only if its use of coercion is morally permissible. ;In this thesis, this fundamental issue is addressed by means of a critique of the libertarian position, as represented by the political theory of Robert Nozick. The libertarian argues that political coercion is morally permissible, but only to the extent needed to protect the property rights of individuals. I argue that the libertarian position fails in at least two ways. ;On the one hand, if morality is defined solely by the existence of natural property rights , then political coercion cannot be justified at all. By reference only to the property rights of individuals not even the libertarian state is legitimate. On the other hand, if one assumes the richer moral theory by reference to which Nozick does, indeed, establish the legitimacy of the state, then a state more extensive than that advocated by the libertarian is justified. ;The evaluation of the libertarian position rests on a theory of coercion developed in the first part of the thesis. It is argued that coercion is a morally neutral concept; and that coercion restricts the worth of liberty only, but not its extent