Abstract

Professor Frankena mentions me as one of the participants in what he calls the Movement in moral philosophy, and I think he is right; I was so moving, or being moved along among others, ten years or so ago, and I think I find myself still inclined to so move, while recognising with regret, when I come to look back at it, that, as he courteously observes, “what such writers say is not as clear as one would like.” I embark on commenting upon his lectures with considerable trepidation, however, for the reason that, while his own writing surely is as clear as one could reasonably hope for, I have had great difficulty in figuring out what exactly it is in the Movement that he substantially dissents from, and have the lurking suspicion that there may be something that I have just failed to see. Tentatively, though, I tend to think that the root of my difficulty has been that he offers, in opposition to the Movement, an account of these matters that is really, in the end, not intelligible; and my main task in this commentative piece will be to try to explain why I think that.