Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

Abstract

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account, but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

The Moral Punishment Instinct.Jan-Willem van Prooijen - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
46 (#106,786)

6 months
46 (#334,637)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The social structure of cooperation and punishment.Herbert Gintis & Ernst Fehr - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):28-29.
Examining punishment at different explanatory levels.Miguel dos Santos & Claus Wedekind - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (1):23-24.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references