Akrasia and self-control

Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):69 – 78 (2009)
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According to Gary Watson (1977), if we choose not to implement a judgment about what it is best to do then we must have changed that judgment. On those grounds he rejects an otherwise plausible account of akrasia, or weakness of will, that explains it in terms of the relative strengths of the agent's desires to act against and in accordance with their evaluative judgment. However, Watson seems to assume what I call a 'principle of closure of evaluation', a principle that I argue can fail. The possibility of such failure of closure of evaluation means that Watson's argument can be resisted, allowing us to maintain this plausible account of akrasia



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David Wall
Australian National University

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References found in this work

Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Value, reality, and desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - New York: Clarendon Press.

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