Abstract

The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) by drawing on the resources available in Canguilhem’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. It consists of six sections. In the first and second section, I outline the so-called ‘mind-life problem’ and two diametrically opposed responses to it: life philosophy (life subsumes mind) and transcendentalism (mind subsumes life). Against this background, I flesh out Canguilhem’s ‘slantwise’ resolution, which argues that, while it is true that life feeds into mind, it is equally true that mind takes up and subl(im)ates life. In the third and fourth section, I focus on the first half of the proposed solution: I start by putting forward a non-reductionist account of life grounded on the idea of vital normativity, and then go on to show how this vital dynamism translates into human cognition via praktognosia (embodied and techn(olog)ical know-how). In the fifth section I tackle the second half of the solution: by delineating the idea of symbolic behavior and ex-centric positionality I try to indicate how mind, while grounded in life, is nonetheless able to transcend it. Finally, in the last section, I suggest that this Janus-faced dynamism between life and mind also holds true for the researcher investigating these topics, and hint at the broader philosophical implication of such a view for the practice of science and philosophy.