Kai von Fintel
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This article introduces the classic accounts of the meaning of conditionals (material implication, strict implication, variably strict conditional) and discusses the difference between indicative and subjunctive/counterfactual conditionals. Then, the restrictor analysis of Lewis/Kratzer/Heim is introduced as a theory of how conditional meanings come about compositionally: if has no meaning other than serving to mark the restriction to an operator elsewhere in the conditional construction. Some recent alternatives to the restrictor analysis are sketched. Lastly, the interactions of conditionals (i) with modality and (ii) with tense and aspect are discussed. Throughout the advanced research literature is referenced while the discussion stays largely non-technical.
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References found in this work BETA

Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
Making Counterfactual Assumptions.Frank Veltman - 2005 - Journal of Semantics 22 (2):159-180.
Is a Possible-Worlds Semantics of Modality Possible? A Problem for Kratzer's Semantics.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 2002 - Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT):339-358.
A Defense of the Limit Assumption.Ken Warmbrod - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):53-66.

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