Abstract

While Christian ethics is ordinarily perceived as a model of deontological ethics, based on observance of absolute rules, the renewal of this discipline in the second half of the 20th century led many Roman Catholic moral theologians to conclude that teleology should hold primacy in Christian moral evaluation. This dissertation seeks to defend philosophically this insight of some leading revisionist moral theologians. ;According to my model for understanding the teleological-deontological distinction, most normative ethical theories combine teleological and deontological styles and assign priority to one orientation over the other. While revisionists claim that Catholic ethics is most faithful to its roots when it assigns primacy to teleology, the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor judges that the teleological orientation of revisionist moral theology collapses into unjustified consequentialism. ;Granted that both secular and religious ethics recognize problems with the teleological orientation as a guide for moral decision, I argue that the work of the revisionist moral theologians contains the resources needed to steer clear of these problems and avoid the collapse into consequentialism. The principal instrument to avoid this collapse is acceptance of deontological constraints essential to the Christian tradition. A strong teleological dynamic linked to deontological constraints provides a context of broad agreement that shows respect for the transcendent dimension of Christian ethics and a united front for Christian moralists in the face of secular ethical theories that reject openness to transcendence. ;The disagreements that remain between the Magisterium and revisionist moral theologians are explained in terms of differences regarding moral methodology, non-moral facts, and the requirements of Christian teleology. I conclude with an argument that revisionist moral theology is a philosophically defensible moral theory that results in genuine good for moral agents and patients