Abstract

IntroductionThe main objective of my paper is to argue that Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is Cartesian in four important respects, viz. its point of departure, consciousness, freedom and dualism. Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is Cartesian insofar as it begins its inquiry into human existence by taking the Cartesian cogito as its stating point. Sartrean consciousness with its essential character of intentionality is Cartesian since it has moorings in Descartes’ conception of the mind the essential nature of which is self-isolation or self-detachment. Sartrean freedom with its nihilating or negating structure has its basis in the Cartesian thesis that the human mind is basically skeptical and secretes nothingness in questioning itself and the world. And, the gaping divide between the Sartrean being-for-itself and being-in-itself has its roots in the insurmountable Cartesian dualism of the two substances, the mind and the body.Materials and MethodsThe seminal/original points discussed in the paper are: Sartre adopted the Cartesian substantial cogito by transforming it into a phenomenological subjectivity which is non-substantial; he gave a phenomenological turn to the Cartesian idea that the mind is of the nature of self-isolation; Sartre gave an ontological status to the Cartesian conception that human reality secretes nothingness by treating it as the inner structure of consciousness, the being of freedom; and Sartrean dualism is more incorrigible than the Cartesian, for Sartre has introduced “non-being,” the impassable empty distance, between consciousness and its object.Conclusion Sartre remains to be a redoubtable dualist despite his claim to the contrary that he overcame all the traditional dualisms through his conception of the monism of the phenomenon; in this, Sartre has taken a metaphysical stance, if not mystical, which is antithetical to phenomenology; and he sustained the dualism in his own inimitable, subtle way to construct an ontology implying division and conflict as the fundamental modes of human existence, the idea having implications for sociopolitical action. The paper brings out all these points under the Section, ‘Cartesian Moorings’ by taking as the background the foregoing analytical discussion of the four constituents of Sartre’s phenomenology, namely, Being, Nothing, Consciousness and Freedom.