Not too proud to Beg (the question): Why inferentialism cannot account for the a priori

Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):113-131 (2006)
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The inferentialist account of the a priori says that basic logical beliefs can be justified by way of rule circular inference. I argue that this account of the a priori fails to skirt the charge of begging the question, that the reasons offered in support of it are weak and that it makes justifying logical beliefs too easy. I also argue that recent modifications to inferentialism spell doom for it as a general theory of a priori justification.



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Michael Veber
East Carolina University

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